Aristotle distinguishes between three kinds of friendship. The first is based on utility; one person is friends with another because the other is useful to him. The second is based on pleasure; one is friends with the other because the other provides pleasure. The third is based on the good, however in this case one is not friends with the other for his own gain or desire. Instead, one wants what is best for his friend. The third friendship is qualitatively different than the first two. The other kinds of friendship are fundamentally selfish and fleeting: once the utility or the pleasure is gone, the friendship is dissolved. Friendship based in the good, on the other hand, is far more stable.
Though all three are called friendship, only friendship based in the good is truly friendship; the others are called friendship only because they resemble true friendship. True friends are useful and pleasurable to one another, but this alone is not the basis of their friendship. Authentic friendship is based in the good. If we are to ask what friendship is in order to establish the role of choice in friendship, an analysis of friendship based on the good is necessary.
Friendship is between those who are "alike in virtue" (Nic. Ethics 1156b10). Here Aristotle may mean they are alike in the virtues in general, but there is a more specific virtue he has in mind: the virtue of friendship. Friendship is between those who possess the virtue of friendship. But what does it mean to possess the virtue of friendship? "They wish for good things for one another in the same way insofar as they are good, and they are good in themselves" (1156b10). Friends desire good things for another as they would desire them for themselves. This is not entirely a selflessness, as there is a sense in which the good for a friend is a good for oneself, but the good for the friend is a good for oneself insofar as it is good first for the friend. Friendship unites people in the good, in such a way that they are intertwined; when good befalls one friend, through that friend it befalls the other. In friendship, the good is not pursued individually, but communally. As all humans seek the good, friendship unites them in this seeking. But friendship is not simply the "wish" for the good of ones friend; this implies passivity.
People are called friends with regard to an active condition, a being-at-work. This is why friends desire to be together, they desire to do things with one another. When friends move away, the friendship is not lost because of the distance; the distance prevents them from being at work together. But simply being at work together does not constitute friendship, if "at work together" is regarded as spacial location. An active condition requires choice, deliberative volition. Friends must recognize their friendship in their being at work with one another. Activity in a close spatial location is not sufficient for friendship, the activity must be carried out consciously for the sake of friendship. Spatiality allows this to occur, but it is only a precondition. When one recognizes the way to act in friendship towards someone else, and chooses to carry it out, he is acting in friendship. Our being at work in the world in virtue, by which we seek to obtain the good, is not a solitary activity. Whether the good can be found in such isolation at all is dubious. In a way, friendship is required for a human to come to be good, one only actualizes ones potential as a social animal with others. In friendship the potential for humans as social animals is actualized in the good. Friendship is the authentic mode of the social dimension of humans, it is being-for-the-sake-of-one-another actualized intentionally in being-at-work-with-one-another.
Though all three are called friendship, only friendship based in the good is truly friendship; the others are called friendship only because they resemble true friendship. True friends are useful and pleasurable to one another, but this alone is not the basis of their friendship. Authentic friendship is based in the good. If we are to ask what friendship is in order to establish the role of choice in friendship, an analysis of friendship based on the good is necessary.
Friendship is between those who are "alike in virtue" (Nic. Ethics 1156b10). Here Aristotle may mean they are alike in the virtues in general, but there is a more specific virtue he has in mind: the virtue of friendship. Friendship is between those who possess the virtue of friendship. But what does it mean to possess the virtue of friendship? "They wish for good things for one another in the same way insofar as they are good, and they are good in themselves" (1156b10). Friends desire good things for another as they would desire them for themselves. This is not entirely a selflessness, as there is a sense in which the good for a friend is a good for oneself, but the good for the friend is a good for oneself insofar as it is good first for the friend. Friendship unites people in the good, in such a way that they are intertwined; when good befalls one friend, through that friend it befalls the other. In friendship, the good is not pursued individually, but communally. As all humans seek the good, friendship unites them in this seeking. But friendship is not simply the "wish" for the good of ones friend; this implies passivity.
People are called friends with regard to an active condition, a being-at-work. This is why friends desire to be together, they desire to do things with one another. When friends move away, the friendship is not lost because of the distance; the distance prevents them from being at work together. But simply being at work together does not constitute friendship, if "at work together" is regarded as spacial location. An active condition requires choice, deliberative volition. Friends must recognize their friendship in their being at work with one another. Activity in a close spatial location is not sufficient for friendship, the activity must be carried out consciously for the sake of friendship. Spatiality allows this to occur, but it is only a precondition. When one recognizes the way to act in friendship towards someone else, and chooses to carry it out, he is acting in friendship. Our being at work in the world in virtue, by which we seek to obtain the good, is not a solitary activity. Whether the good can be found in such isolation at all is dubious. In a way, friendship is required for a human to come to be good, one only actualizes ones potential as a social animal with others. In friendship the potential for humans as social animals is actualized in the good. Friendship is the authentic mode of the social dimension of humans, it is being-for-the-sake-of-one-another actualized intentionally in being-at-work-with-one-another.
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